The leading development
On August 21, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit published Fuston v. Quick, affirming the denial of federal habeas relief to an Oklahoma prisoner sentenced to death. The court had previously granted a certificate of appealability on two constitutional issues: whether the jury should have received a lesser-included-offense instruction and whether the prisoner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability.
The panel nevertheless denied relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The majority concluded that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had not unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law. One judge agreed on the jury-instruction issue but dissented from the intellectual-disability ruling, concluding that the evidence warranted a hearing. The decision is a court ruling, not commentary, but later rehearing or Supreme Court proceedings could alter its effect.
Why a certificate of appealability was not enough
A certificate of appealability is an appellate gateway. It identifies an issue on which the applicant has made the required threshold showing; it does not decide the claim and does not remove AEDPA’s restrictions. Fuston illustrates that separation. The Tenth Circuit considered both certified questions on the merits, yet still asked whether the state court’s adjudication crossed the much higher boundary established by § 2254(d).
That distinction matters for families who understandably read a granted certificate as a major victory. It is meaningful because the appeal may proceed, but the applicant must still satisfy the governing standard of review, preservation rules, the record limitations applicable to the claim, and any independent procedural barriers. An appeal can therefore present a substantial constitutional question without producing a new trial, hearing, resentencing, or release.
The AEDPA question is not simply whether the federal judges disagree
Section 2254(d)(1) generally prevents a federal court from granting relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The inquiry is not whether the federal judges would have ruled differently if deciding the constitutional issue in the first instance.
The Fuston majority emphasized that only Supreme Court holdings can supply the clearly established rule for this part of the analysis. It relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Klein v. Martin, which reinforced the requirement to give state-court merits decisions substantial deference. A serious error, debatable reasoning, or a state decision that lacks detail does not automatically satisfy that standard.
The intellectual-disability issue exposed a real division
The record described four IQ scores: 59, 69, 75, and 81. Oklahoma law treated the score above 75 as preventing a finding of intellectual disability. The majority held that Atkins v. Virginia and later Supreme Court cases did not clearly establish that a person presenting this combination of scores must receive an Atkins hearing. It stressed the unresolved question of how multiple IQ scores should be evaluated together.
The dissent framed the issue differently. In its view, Supreme Court precedent clearly required a hearing once the evidence raised a reasonable doubt about intellectual disability. The dissent also pointed to evidence that the highest score was obtained at age twelve and that later cognitive decline may have occurred. This disagreement is important, but a dissent is not the panel’s controlling judgment.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the unresolved multiple-score problem
In Hamm v. Smith, decided May 21, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed review of a dispute involving multiple IQ scores. The separate opinions explained that the record and litigation posture did not provide a suitable vehicle for announcing a single method for weighing several results. Fuston treated that absence of detailed Supreme Court guidance as critical under AEDPA’s clearly-established-law requirement.
This does not mean that intellectual-disability evidence is irrelevant or that every state rule using IQ scores is constitutional. The Supreme Court has held that states do not possess unlimited discretion and that intellectual-disability determinations must account for accepted clinical principles. The narrower point in Fuston is procedural: the majority found no sufficiently specific Supreme Court holding that compelled federal habeas relief on the mixed-score facts before it.
Practical review points
A meaningful § 2254 review should identify the last reasoned state-court decision, the exact constitutional claim it resolved, the evidence that was presented to that court, and the Supreme Court holdings existing at the relevant time. The analysis should separate whether a constitutional violation occurred from whether AEDPA permits a federal court to grant relief despite the state adjudication.
For intellectual-disability claims, the file may require every test report—not merely a list of scores—along with information about test validity, standard error of measurement, developmental history, adaptive functioning, education, medical and neurological conditions, head injuries, expert conclusions, and when each item entered the state record. Preservation and record development can become decisive because federal habeas review is not ordinarily a fresh evidentiary trial.
- Confirm whether the state court decided the federal claim on the merits and identify its stated reasoning.
- Match each requested remedy to the exact Supreme Court holding said to require it.
- Separate the certificate-of-appealability threshold from the standard governing ultimate relief.
- Preserve the procedural history, testing records, expert materials, and evidence actually presented in state court.
Limits and what comes next
Fuston is a published Tenth Circuit decision arising from an Oklahoma capital case. It does not automatically control every intellectual-disability claim, every jury-instruction dispute, or cases outside that circuit. Different facts, a different state-court posture, a claim under § 2254(d)(2), or a case proceeding without AEDPA deference may require a different analysis. Federal prisoners ordinarily challenge convictions and sentences through § 2255, a related but distinct procedure.
The parties may seek rehearing, and Supreme Court review may be requested; neither possibility changes the present judgment unless further action is taken. Families and advocates should avoid treating the decision as proof that a certificate of appealability is meaningless or that intellectual-disability claims cannot succeed. It instead demonstrates why federal habeas strategy must address the constitutional merits, the state-court record, and AEDPA’s separate barriers at the same time. This article provides general educational information, not individualized legal advice.