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Federal Appeals, Digital Evidence & Collateral Review11 minute read

Chatrie Makes Geofence Location Data a Fourth Amendment Search. Suppression Still Depends on the Warrant and Remedy.

The Supreme Court held that police conduct a search when they obtain a person's Google Location History through a geofence warrant. The Court did not decide whether the warrant was reasonable, whether the evidence must be suppressed, or whether final convictions can be reopened.

Prepared by the PCRA Legal Research and Policy Team

The Supreme Court held that obtaining Google Location History is a search

On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court decided Chatrie v. United States. The Court held that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they used a geofence warrant to obtain Okello Chatrie's Google Location History. A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information, and the government intrudes on that protected interest when it demands the information from a technology company.

The Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded. That result establishes the threshold point that a search occurred, but it does not itself establish that the search was unreasonable, that the warrant was invalid at every step, or that exclusion of the evidence is the proper remedy.

A bank-robbery investigation used a three-step geofence process

Investigators sought information about devices located within 150 meters of a Virginia credit union around the time of a robbery. At the first step, Google produced anonymized location data for devices within the geofence during a one-hour period. Officers then narrowed the list and received more location data, including movements outside the geofence during a broader period. At the final step, Google disclosed identifying information for a still-smaller group, including Chatrie.

Chatrie moved to suppress the location evidence. The district court concluded that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment but admitted the evidence under the good-faith exception. A divided Fourth Circuit panel instead held that no search occurred, and the en banc court affirmed by an evenly divided vote. The Supreme Court reviewed only whether acquiring the Location History was a search.

Location History can reveal more than ordinary business records

Chatrie builds on Carpenter v. United States, which recognized privacy protection for historical cell-site location information. Google Location History was even more precise: it could record a device about every two minutes, locate it within roughly twenty meters, and sometimes identify its elevation. The Court reasoned that this information can reconstruct movements and reveal visits to homes, medical offices, religious institutions, political organizations, and other sensitive places.

The limited time window did not eliminate the privacy interest. The government selected a narrow period from an extensive database capable of reconstructing movement over time. The Court rejected the idea that Fourth Amendment protection begins only after the government obtains some minimum quantity of location data.

Ordinary phone use did not make the information freely available to police

The government argued that Chatrie voluntarily exposed his location information to Google and therefore lost any reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine. The Court disagreed. Location History is highly revealing, and the information is not shared in the ordinary sense merely because a phone user activates and uses modern applications and cloud services.

The Court also rejected an app-by-app or feature-by-feature approach that would make privacy turn on the precise prompts a user clicked. Smartphones function through services that routinely collect data, and users do not thereby grant law enforcement unrestricted access to the resulting record of their movements.

The Court did not decide whether this geofence warrant was reasonable

The Fourth Amendment generally requires probable cause and particularity when police obtain a warrant to search for evidence. A geofence warrant begins without a named suspect and can sweep information from multiple people merely because their devices were near a location. Chatrie raised questions about the geographic radius, time window, anonymized production, expansion outside the geofence, narrowing criteria, and eventual identification of users.

The Fourth Circuit had not decided whether each step of this unusual warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity because it stopped at the no-search ruling. The Supreme Court declined to decide those questions first and returned them to the court of appeals. Chatrie therefore does not establish that every geofence warrant is unconstitutional or valid.

A Fourth Amendment violation does not automatically require suppression

The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy, not an automatic consequence of every Fourth Amendment violation. Courts may examine whether officers relied objectively and reasonably on a warrant, whether an affidavit was so deficient that reliance was unreasonable, whether the magistrate abandoned a neutral role, or whether another exception applies. The district court had relied on the good-faith exception, but the Supreme Court did not decide whether that ruling should ultimately control.

On remand, the Fourth Circuit must first address the warrant's reasonableness and then any preserved remedy questions necessary to resolve the appeal. The case may still end without suppression even though the Supreme Court has now confirmed that police performed a search.

Pending cases should separate the search, warrant, and remedy issues

In a pending federal prosecution, counsel generally must raise suppression issues through the procedures and timing rules governing pretrial motions. A complete motion should identify the data source, warrant, affidavit, return, production stages, geographic boundary, time period, number of devices, narrowing instructions, identification request, and every additional investigative step derived from the location data.

The legal analysis should be divided into distinct questions: whether government conduct was a search; whether the warrant or another authorization made it reasonable; whether probable cause and particularity existed at each step; whether an exception to the warrant requirement applies; and whether suppression reaches the challenged evidence or its fruits. Chatrie resolves only the first question for the Location History at issue.

  • Obtain the warrant application, affidavit, issued warrant, return, and provider production.
  • Map each geographic boundary and time window used at every production stage.
  • Identify how many anonymized devices were produced, narrowed, expanded, and unmasked.
  • Trace later interviews, searches, warrants, identifications, and admissions to the geofence data.
  • Preserve separate arguments on search, reasonableness, good faith, standing, causation, and prejudice.

Final federal convictions do not reopen automatically

Chatrie arose on direct review and did not address 28 U.S.C. § 2255, collateral-review retroactivity, procedural default, appeal or collateral-attack waivers, or the one-year limitation period. A person with a final federal conviction must still identify an available procedural vehicle and show how the new decision affects the actual record and judgment.

The Supreme Court did not state that Chatrie applies retroactively to final cases. Whether a collateral claim is timely and cognizable may depend on the nature of the rule, when the right was recognized, circuit precedent, prior § 2255 litigation, and whether the Supreme Court has made a new constitutional rule retroactive for purposes of a successive motion. No deadline should be calculated from the decision without individualized review.

State prisoners face an additional collateral-review restriction

Chatrie's Fourth Amendment holding can be relevant to state prosecutions involving similar geofence evidence. But a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief faces more than the merits of the search issue. Under Stone v. Powell, federal habeas ordinarily does not relitigate a Fourth Amendment exclusion claim when the state provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of that claim.

A related ineffective-assistance claim is analytically different and requires proof under its own constitutional standard, including deficient performance and prejudice. State post-conviction procedures, preservation rules, statutes of limitation, and remedies also vary. A federal decision about what counts as a search does not create a universal state collateral remedy.

Prejudice and the remaining evidence matter

Even if location evidence should have been excluded, relief may depend on whether the error affected the outcome. Courts may examine other surveillance footage, eyewitness evidence, admissions, physical evidence, independent warrants, witness testimony, and the prosecution's use of the location data. The inquiry is not limited to whether the challenged evidence appeared somewhere in the file.

A post-conviction review should reconstruct the causal chain. Determine whether the geofence data merely identified a lead, supplied probable cause for later searches, shaped an interrogation, corroborated other proof, or became a central trial exhibit. Then identify the governing harmless-error, prejudice, or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree standard for the procedural posture.

Technology changes do not erase the issue in older cases

The opinion notes that Google changed its storage practices in July 2025 and represented that it can no longer respond to geofence warrants seeking centrally stored Location History in the same way. That operational change may reduce future use of this particular process, but it does not remove the issue from prosecutions and convictions built on earlier geofence productions.

Other companies and other location technologies may present different facts. Chatrie concerns the characteristics of Google Location History and the demand used in that case. Courts will still need to evaluate the precision, duration, user relationship, provider control, warrant structure, and investigative method of a different dataset.

Limits and caution

Chatrie holds that police conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they obtain the type of Google Location History at issue through a geofence warrant. It does not decide whether the warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, whether good faith prevents suppression, whether every provider's data receives identical treatment, or whether any final conviction must be reopened.

This article provides general educational information, not legal advice, a suppression ruling, a deadline calculation, a retroactivity determination, or a conclusion that any conviction is invalid. The warrant materials, provider production, preservation history, trial evidence, appellate record, prior collateral filings, and controlling jurisdictional law must be reviewed for the individual matter.

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